

Incentivizing Side-Channel Freedom with Leakage-Aware Computation

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Reality 1: Microarchitectural Side-Channels Subvert System Security

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CacheBleed (2016)

Spectre (2017)

Meltdown (2017)

Spectre-NG (2018)

Herzbleed (2022)

GoFetch (2024)

Reality 1: Microarchitectural Side-Channels Subvert System Security

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...or just `ls /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/`

Reality 2: Infrastructure Providers *Have Little Incentive* to Guarantee Side- Channel Freedom

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Performance overhead

Deployment cost

Maintenance cost

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When leakage occurs,
Victims **can't** hold providers accountable,


Reality 2: Infrastructure Providers *Have Little Incentive* to Guarantee Side- Channel Freedom

When leakage occurs,
Victims **can't** hold providers accountable,
because μ Arch leakage is **hard to notice**.

Finding an *ultimate* leak-free system architecture

~~Finding an *ultimate* leak-free system architecture~~
Making μ Arch leakage *tangible* to victims

Symmetry Conjecture of Side Channels



Symmetric Power Between Victim and Attacker

Leakage-Aware Computation

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Incentivizes infrastructure
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As a starting point, we tackle on *cache* side-channel leakage

Proposal: A program enhancer that converts a program P to a **functionally-equivalent** *cache-leakage-aware* twin P^* .

Example: P

```
1  if secret {  
2    doFoo;  
3  } else {  
4    doBoo;  
5  }
```

Example: P^*

```
1 let _ = (*la, *lb, *lc, *ld); // Preload Phase
2 let t0 = now!();              // Execute Phase
3 let t1 = if secret {
4     la: doFoo; lb: now!()
5 } else {
6     lc: doBoo; ld: now!()
7 };
8 if t1 - t0 >= THRES || time!({ let _ = *la; }) >= THRES
9 || ... { panic!("Leaked!"); } // Check Phase (Omitted
    checks for lb, lc, ld)
```

Example: P^*

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1 let _ = (*la, *lb, *lc, *ld); // Preload Phase
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Example: P^*

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1 let _ = (*la, *lb, *lc, *ld); // Preload Phase
2 let t0 = now!(); // Execute Phase
3 let t1 = if secret {
4   la: c Foo; lb: now!()
5 } else {
6   lb: doBoo; ld: now!()
7 };
8 if t1 - t0 >= THRES || time!({ let _ = *la; }) >= THRES
9 || ... { panic!("Leaked!"); } // Check Phase (Omitted
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Questions?